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MIRANDA GOES TO THE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE:
STATE V. ANTONIO T. AND JUVENILE MIRANDA
WARNINGS IN SCHOOLS
Javier B Garcia*

INTRODUCTION
A child in school is sent to the vice principal’s office, on suspicion that he
has been drinking alcohol.1 While the vice principal talks to the child, a school police
officer is in the same room silently preparing a portable breath test to determine
whether the child indeed drank alcohol. The child confesses to the vice principal and
the officer administers the test, which gives a positive result. The officer then reads
the child his Miranda rights,2 and the child refuses to answer any of the officer’s
questions regarding alcohol use. Nonetheless, the state later charges the child with
possession of alcoholic beverages by a minor. Does a silent officer’s mere presence
while a school administrator questions a child about an issue involving both school
discipline and delinquent behavior trigger the requirement of a Miranda warning?
Could the state use the child’s confession in pursuing charges against him, even
though he confessed to the vice principal and not to the officer?
In State v. Antonio T., the New Mexico Supreme Court found that such an
encounter triggered a Miranda warning.3 The officer’s mere presence transformed
the encounter between the vice principal and the child into a coercive and adversarial
environment commonly found in a criminal investigation.4 Accordingly, the officer
not only should have provided a Miranda warning but also should have obtained a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver before the child’s statements could be
admissible.5 Because the officer failed to obtain a waiver, the statements were not
admissible in a delinquency proceeding.6

* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2017; B.A. History, 2012, University of
California at Berkeley. Special thanks to Professor Dawinder Sidhu for his unrelenting guidance and
admirable teaching style. Additional thanks to go my former students at Centennial High School and South
Valley Academy, who remind me of the importance of a child’s constitutional rights at school. Most
importantly, I want to thank Alison and my parents, Jesús and Luz García, for providing boundless love,
kindness and support.
1. These facts are modeled after those in State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, 352 P.3d 1172.
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966) (announcing the establishment of Miranda
rights, which are warnings given to a criminal suspect by police to protect the suspect’s privilege against
self-incrimination during a custodial interrogation). See id. at 467–73 (explaining that Miranda rights
include the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during any questioning, and the
right to an appointed attorney if the individual wants an attorney but cannot afford to hire one). See also
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (extending the application of Miranda rights to children).
3. 2015-NMSC-019, ¶ 26.
4. Id. ¶ 27.
5. Id. ¶ 30.
6. Id. ¶ 31.
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New Mexico provides among the most expansive Miranda protections in
the United States. Across the country, an officer must provide a Miranda warning
when subjecting a child to a custodial interrogation.7 By contrast, under the statutory
expansion of Miranda,8 an officer in New Mexico must provide a Miranda warning
when subjecting a child to an investigatory detention, under circumstances less
coercive than a custodial interrogation.9 And, as Antonio T. showed, those
circumstances include a silent officer’s mere presence while a school administrator
questions a child.10 When placed in the context of New Mexico’s approach to
juvenile Miranda rights, Antonio T. represents another expansion of protections.
Yet, the Court in Antonio T. described a limiting principle. It emphasized
that a school administrator should not be required to provide a Miranda warning
when questioning a child for a violation of school discipline.11 It reasoned that an
administrator should have flexibility in disciplinary procedures in order to maintain
security and order in schools.12 This flexibility, the Court recognized, will help
preserve the informality of the student-teacher relationship. When a police officer is
in the room during questioning, however, the informal relationship disappears and
the questioning evolves into a criminal investigation.
But suppose the officer in Antonio T. were not in the vice principal’s office,
and the child confesses only to the vice principal. Suppose further that the vice
principal, outside the presence of the child, later informs the officer of the child’s
confession, and the state charges the child with possession of alcoholic beverages by
a minor. Should the child be entitled to a Miranda warning? If so, who should
provide it? This Note argues that a school administrator should provide a Miranda
warning to a child if the administrator alone questions a child about conduct that is
both a school disciplinary violation and a delinquent act and subsequently reports a
child’s confession to a police officer. It contends that an administrator creates just as
coercive an environment when questioning a child as an officer who conducts the
same questioning. Additionally, several school districts in New Mexico require that
an administrator report certain conduct to a police officer. In light of the coercive
impact of the school administrator-police officer relationship, the frequency of
reporting student misbehavior to police, and the unique aspects of a child’s cognitive
development, the statutory Miranda protections should extend when an administrator
reports a child’s confession to a police officer.
Part I provides the constitutional and statutory backdrop for providing a
Miranda warning. First, it describes the historical practices used to extract
information from accused criminals and the emergence of the Fifth Amendment as a
means to curb those practices. Second, it discusses the Miranda Court’s reasoning
for providing a warning for people undergoing a custodial interrogation. Third, it
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
8. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(A) (1993, as amended through 1999).
9. See State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 32, 42, 33 P.3d 1.
10. See Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, ¶ 23.
11. See id. ¶ 24 (“Questioning a child for school disciplinary matter is distinguishable from
questioning a child for suspected criminal wrongdoing.”).
12. See id. (Because “maintaining security and order in . . . schools requires a certain degree of
flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,” we recognize “the value of preserving the informality of the
student teacher relationship.” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
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explains the application of Miranda warnings to children. Finally, it ends by
discussing New Mexico’s departure from the federal approach toward providing
more expansive Miranda protections for children.
Part II analyzes the necessity of providing a Miranda warning when an
administrator alone questions a child and reports confession to law enforcement.
First, it considers the coercive impact of the school administrator-police officer
relationship. Second, it discusses specific policies in New Mexico schools with
respect to interrogating students and reporting conduct to police. Finally, it explains
the inadequacy of the agency framework as an alternative for providing a Miranda
warning.
Part III addresses countervailing concerns for the proposed rule. First, it
discusses a concern that school administrators lack substantive legal knowledge for
providing a Miranda warning. Second, it describes whether a Miranda warning
impedes a school’s ability for responding to school disciplinary violations. Third, it
explains a child’s potential difficulty in understanding a Miranda warning and
whether a child will adequately assert his or her Miranda rights. Finally, it considers
the impact of the proposed rule when a school administrator questions a student with
a disability. Part IV outlines recommendations for school districts and administrators
who question children. It provides concrete instructions on providing a Miranda
warning if an administrator reports a child’s confession to a police officer.
This is the first scholarly treatment on the contours of New Mexico’s
statutory expansion of Miranda in the wake of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
decision in Antonio T. Some existing scholarship focuses on the application of
Miranda in schools.13 Yet, none focus exclusively on the unique statutory framework
that exists in New Mexico. Other scholarship extensively discusses the impact of
police interrogations in schools.14 While that scholarship sheds light on the proposed
rule in this Note, this Note devotes attention to the role of a school administrator
when questioning a child and reporting the information to police.
Police officers in schools have recently come under intense scrutiny in light
of their aggressive responses to a child’s misbehavior.15 This scrutiny prompted
reports on the proper role of an officer in a school, and the skills an officer needs
when interacting with a child.16 While an officer’s response to student misbehavior
deserves attention, so too does a school administrator’s response. Addressing student
misbehavior is among the variety of functions an administrator performs in school.
But reporting a confession to police undermines the child’s privilege against self13. See, e.g., Kristi North, Comment, Recess is Over: Granting Miranda Rights to Students
Interrogated Inside School Walls, 62 EMORY L. REV. 441 (2012); Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda:
Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 65 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets
Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 978 (2009–2010).
15. See, e.g., Dana Ford, Greg Botelho & Kevin Conlon, Spring Valley High School officer suspended
after violent classroom arrest, CNN (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/us/south-carolinaschool-arrest-video/ (reporting a video showing a deputy “standing over a student . . . sharply tugging her
toward the front of the classroom. [The student] flies out of her desk and slides several feet across the
floor.”).
16. See Richard Pérez-Peña, Christine Hauser & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Rough Student Arrest Puts
Spotlight on School Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/policeofficers-in-schools.html.
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incrimination. It provides a police officer and the state with the very testimony
needed for a criminal prosecution without requiring them to comply with a child’s
right to remain silent. An administrator who provides a Miranda warning before
questioning the child and reporting it to the police will safeguard that child’s
privilege.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Development of the Miranda Warning
1.

Pre-Miranda: Historical Development of the Warning

The nature of coerced confessions was known long before the Supreme
Court decided Miranda. Early English and American courts recognized that coerced
confessions are inherently untrustworthy.17 Seventy years before Miranda, the
Supreme Court described “the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons” prevalent in seventeenth-century England.18 Among
those methods was “the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if
he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap into fatal
contradictions.”19 In light of the nature of coerced confessions, the Supreme Court
evaluated the admissibility of a suspect’s confession under a voluntariness test. The
Court found two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be
voluntary: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment20 and the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.21 While the Due Process Clause
remains a viable basis upon which to determine the voluntariness of a suspect’s
confession,22 the Fifth Amendment is the primary vehicle for making that
determination.23

17. See, e.g., King v. Rudd (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (stating that the English courts excluded
confessions obtained by threats and promises); King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (“A
free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow form the
strongest sense of guilt . . . but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture
of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is
rejected.”); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
18. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896).
19. Id. at 596–97.
20. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (reversing a criminal conviction under the
Due Process Clause because it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion).
21. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that the voluntariness test “is
controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment . . . commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”).
22. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (explaining that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the voluntariness of a confession depends on “whether a defendant’s will was overborne” by the
circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. This analysis takes into consideration “the totality
of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.”).
23. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda v. Arizona is the seminal case that established a criminal suspect’s
right to remain silent and to have an attorney, either retained or appointed, when a
law enforcement officer places the suspect into custody.24 The Supreme Court
understood that a police interrogation entails “inherently compelling pressures” that,
even for an adult, can “undermine the individual’s will to resist and . . . compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”25 The Miranda Court
mentioned several aspects of that produce this pressure: the isolating nature of the
interrogation,26 their psychological orientation,27 and the interrogator’s trickery.28 In
order to protect a suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, a law enforcement officer must provide the suspect with a warning.29
But in order to trigger the warning, the suspect must undergo a custodial
interrogation. The Miranda Court described a custodial interrogation as “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way.”30 An individual is subject
to custodial interrogation when he or she lacks the freedom to leave to an extent
equal to formal arrest.31 But the lack of freedom to leave is not the only fact that
renders an interrogation custodial.32 The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Cooper went to great lengths to describe the nature of a police encounter such that
the suspect would be subjected to a custodial interrogation:
Miranda was focused upon the private and secret interrogation of
a suspect in an isolated environment completely controlled by law
enforcement officials. Isolation is the key aspect of the custodial
interrogation under Miranda. In this setting, the police have
immediate control over the suspect- they can restrain him and
subject him to their questioning and apply whatever psychological
techniques they think will be most effective. It is much easier, in
such a setting, for investigators, intent upon obtaining a
confession, to crush a suspect’s will.33
3.

In re Gault

In In re Gault, the Supreme Court expressly extended its holding in
Miranda to children accused of committing crimes.34 The Gault Court emphasized
that “admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution.”35 It explained
24. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25. Id. at 467.
26. Id. at 449.
27. Id. at 448.
28. Id. at 453.
29. Id. at 444.
30. Id.
31. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 18, 33 P.3d 1 (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983).
32. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 18 (citing State v. Cooper, 1997–NMSC–058, ¶ 36, 949 P.2d 660).
33. Cooper, 1996-NMSC-058, ¶ 36.
34. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Id. at 45.
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its reasons for providing the right to a child in much the same manner that it reasoned
that adults should have the right:
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot
be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which
would leave a man could and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great
instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year-old
lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a
ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might stand
the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad
of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs
counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear,
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the
overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him.36
In addition to the requirement that an adult or child undergo a custodial
interrogation in order to receive a Miranda warning under the Fifth Amendment, it
is also critical to understand who must provide the warning. Since a warning
implicates the Fifth Amendment, the state action doctrine applies,37 meaning that
only state officials are charged with providing a warning. But with respect to
Miranda warnings, not all state officials must provide one. A law enforcement
officer is certainly expected to provide a warning, as the Miranda Court made
abundantly clear.38 But other state officials, such as school administrators, are
generally not required to provide one, primarily when the conduct that would
ordinarily give rise to a warning is a response to school discipline and not a criminal
investigation.39
This Note takes issue with the rigid principle that a school administrator is
generally exempt from providing a Miranda warning when questioning a child for
school discipline. An administrator may have a legitimate interest in maintaining the
health and safety of children in school. Questioning students on suspected violations
of discipline is generally an appropriate means through which to maintain that health
and safety. Yet, an administrator who reports a child’s confession to a law
enforcement officer undermines that child’s privilege against self-incrimination. The
administrator’s report aims not to remedying school discipline, but at providing law
enforcement with evidence needed in a criminal investigation. Accordingly, an
administrator should be held to the same strictures as an officer when reporting a
child’s confession.

36. Id. at 45–46.
37. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (“The Constitution’s
protections of individual liberty and equal protection apply in general only to action by the government.”).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 444 (1966).
39. See State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, ¶ 32, 352 P.3d 1172 (“We emphasize that our holding
in this case should not be construed to require school administrators to advise a child of his or her right to
remain silent in order to use incriminating statements elicited from the child against that child in school
disciplinary proceedings.”).
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New Mexico’s Departure from the Majority Approach

New Mexico departed significantly from the Supreme Court’s approach in
providing Miranda warnings. As a sovereign, New Mexico has the power to enact
its own set of laws that provide greater protections than those available under the
United States Constitution. Among those greater protections are Miranda rights
available to children.40 The New Mexico Legislature enacted statutory Miranda
rights using language markedly different than what the Supreme Court of the United
States used.41 Additionally, the New Mexico Supreme Court developed the contours
of those rights, making it applicable under less coercive circumstances than a
custodial interrogation.42 Taken together, efforts by the New Mexico Legislature and
New Mexico Supreme Court represent a steadfast commitment to extend a child’s
Miranda rights.
1.

New Mexico Children’s Code

Enacted in 1993, the New Mexico’s Children’s Code was meant to embody
the New Mexico Legislature’s efforts to provide rights available to children in the
state.43 Article 1 describes many purposes of the Children’s Code, among which are:
“to provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and physical development
of children;”44 “to provide judicial and other procedures through which . . . the
parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights are
recognized and enforced;”45 and “to reduce overrepresentation of minority children
and families in the juvenile justice, family services and abuse and neglect systems.”46
As a means to achieve these purposes, the legislature also enacted a statute
providing for the basic rights of children with respect to delinquent acts.47 Entitled
“Basic rights,” this statute provides, in part, that “[n]o person subject to the
provisions of the Delinquency Act who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent
child shall be interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of the child’s
constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.”48 As
a provision dealing with interrogation and questioning, it shares language also
provided under Miranda. It refers to a waiver that a child must make in order for that
child’s statements to be admissible in a delinquency proceeding. Specifically, the
waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,” language the Miranda Court
also included.49
However, this provision includes language not found in either the United
States Constitution or Miranda. First, the provision reaches a child who is either

40. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14 (1993, as amended through 1999).
41. See id.
42. See State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, ¶ 19, 33 P.3d 1.
43. See generally § 32A-1-3.
44. § 32A-1-3(A).
45. § 32A-1-3(B).
46. § 32A-1-3(E).
47. See § 32A-2-14.
48. See § 32A-2-14(C).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”).
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“alleged” or “suspected” to have committed a delinquent act, although neither word
is defined in the statute.50 Significantly, it makes no mention that the child be
subjected to a custodial interrogation. In fact, “custody” is not included anywhere in
the statute. As the New Mexico Supreme Court would reason in State v. Javier M.,
the absence of “custody” suggests that the statute was not intended merely to codify
Miranda’s holding.51 Second, the provision states that a child must be advised of
“constitutional rights.”52 Yet, the statute does not specify the constitutional rights of
which the child must be advised. Similar to the absence of “custody,” the New
Mexico Supreme Court interpreted “constitutional rights” to include a different
subset of rights than the Miranda Court found.53
Consistent with its power as a sovereign, New Mexico enacted Section
32A-2-14 to protect a child’s constitutional rights during an interrogation or
questioning. But the the language of the provision does not lend itself for a simple
interpretation and application. Specifically, the absence of “custody” in and lack of
specific “constitutional rights” to which a child is entitled suggest that the provision
attaches rights under different circumstances than what the Miranda Court held.
2.

State v. Javier M.

The New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the contours of Section 32A2-14(C) in State v. Javier M.54 In that case, police officers in Hobbs, New Mexico,
were dispatched to an apartment in response to a loud music complaint.55 As the
officers approached the building, they saw a female, who yelled “Five O” and ran
inside the apartment.56 When they reached the front door of the apartment, the
officers heard scuffling, the music was turned off, and an officer could smell alcohol
and marijuana from inside the apartment.57 When the door opened, the officers
smelled a stronger odor of alcohol and marijuana, and noticed between ten and
fifteen individuals inside.58 They separated the individuals under eighteen from the
adults.59 One of the officers spoke with Javier, a fifteen-year-old inside the
apartment.60 Although Javier did not appear intoxicated, the officer detected the
smell of alcohol on his breath or clothing.61 The officer took Javier to a stairwell near
the apartment and asked for his name, age, and whether he consumed any alcohol.62
Javier answered the officer’s questions and admitted that he consumed alcohol.63

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

§ 32A-2-14(C).
See infra Part I.B.2.
§ 32A-2-14(C).
See infra Part I.B.2.
2001-NMSC-030, 33 P.3d 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
See id. (explaining that “Five O” is slang for police).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
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The Court concluded that the officer should have provided Javier with a
Miranda right before asking him questions.64 It first observed that Javier would not
have been entitled to a warning under Miranda, since he was not undergoing a
custodial interrogation.65 The Court found that the limited duration of the officer’s
questioning and its public nature suggest that the child was not deprived of his
freedom to the extent found in a custodial interrogation.66 Nonetheless, it interpreted
Section 32A-2-14(C) to provide for a Miranda warning even in the absence of a
custodial interrogation.67 In other words, the Court reasoned that “the Legislature
intended [Section 32A-2-14] to provide greater protection to juveniles than is
afforded to adults in the area of police questioning.”68 Looking to the language of the
provision, the Court reasoned that the statute provides for a Miranda warning when
a child is either “alleged”69 or “suspected”70 of committing a delinquent act, neither
of which are the equivalent to a custodial interrogation.71 The Court emphasized that
“[g]iven a child’s possible immaturity and susceptibility to intimidation, a child who
is subject to an investigatory detention may feel pressures similar to those
experienced by adults during custodial interrogation.”72 An investigatory detention
occurs when “a child . . . is detained or seized and suspected of wrongdoing.”73 If the
child is subjected to an investigatory detention, he or she “must be advised of his or
her right to remain silent and that if the child waives that right, anything said can be
used against them.”74 Therefore, unlike the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that a
child undergo a custodial interrogation to receive a Miranda warning, an
investigatory detention is the threshold condition that triggers a warning for a child.
Additionally, the Javier M. Court interpreted the scope of “constitutional
rights” provided under Section 32A-2-14(C). It interpreted “constitutional rights” to
include only the right to remain silent and that a child’s statements could be used
against him or her.75 It declined to parallel Miranda’s holding by including the right
to an appointed lawyer during an investigatory detention.76 It reasoned that Section
32A-2-14(C) would present unworkable situations that would greatly infringe on a
child’s fundamental rights if the provision included a right to counsel.77 If an officer
were required to advise the child that he has the right to counsel during an
64. Id. ¶ 1.
65. Id. ¶ 21.
66. Id. ¶ 48.
67. Id. ¶ 1.
68. Id. ¶ 48.
69. See id. ¶ 29 (defining “alleged” as a “specific legal term which pertains to the time period after
which a formal petition alleging delinquency has been filed in the Children’s Court” (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 74 (7th ed.1999))).
70. See id. (defining “suspected” as a “period prior to the filing of a petition when a child is believed
to have committed a crime or offense but has not yet been formally charged” (citing WEBSTER’S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1189 (1985)).
71. Id.
72. Id. ¶ 37.
73. Id. ¶ 48.
74. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 41.
76. Id. ¶ 46.
77. See id.
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investigatory detention, the Court emphasized, the officer would have to further
detain the child so that an attorney may be either retained or appointed. Since an
investigatory detention is valid only if it is limited in scope and duration, an officer
who detains a child simply to find an attorney would likely violate the child’s Fourth
Amendment rights against an unreasonable seizure.78
The significance of the Javier M. Court’s decision not to interpret the
protections under Section 32A-2-14(C) as merely a parallel to Miranda is a
willingness to recognize the unique circumstances that occur when an officer
subjects a child to an investigatory detention. Specifically, an officer would likely
violate the Fourth Amendment by detaining a child for an unreasonable length of
time during an investigatory detention. But the same violation may not occur if a
school administrator questions a child for the same length of time in order to address
a school disciplinary issue. While this Note does not explore the implications that
may arise when an officer does not inform a child of a right to counsel during an
investigatory detention, the Court’s focus remains on the coercive impact an officer
creates when questions a child. Even when a case involves a school administrator
questioning a child, as Antonio T. showed, the Court remains steadfast in analyzing
coercion caused by a law enforcement officer.
3.

State v. Antonio T.

On April 14, 2010, two teachers working at Kirtland Central High School
(KCHS) in Kirtland, NM, escorted Antonio T. to the Vice Principal Vanessa Sarna’s
office on the suspicion that he was intoxicated.79 Once Antonio was in her office,
Principal Sarna called Deputy Emerson Charley into her office to administer a
portable breath test.80 Deputy Charley is a police officer who served in the San Juan
County Sheriff’s Office for over eleven years before being assigned to KCHS as the
student resource officer.81 On that day, Deputy Charley wore his full uniform,
equipped with all of the standard instruments of lethal and non-lethal force.82 Deputy
Charley stood five feet from Antonio, preparing the breath test, while Principal Sarna
questioned Antonio about drinking alcohol at school.83 Although Deputy Charley’s
normal procedure was to question a student suspected of drinking alcohol prior to
administering a breath alcohol test, since Principal Sarna asked Antonio questions
identical to the questions he would have asked, he merely listened attentively to
Principal Sarna’s questioning.84 She asked Antonio whether he had been drinking,
what he drank, how much he drank, and if anyone else was drinking with him.85 She
told him that if he told her the truth, he would receive a lesser term of suspension.86
78. Id.
79. State v. Antonio T., 2013-NMCA-035, ¶ 2, 298 P.3d 484.
80. Id.
81. State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, ¶ 4, 352 P.3d 1172.
82. Antonio T., 2013-NMCA-035, ¶ 2.
83. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, ¶ 5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Principal Sarna testified that her questions and bargains to Antonio were ones she routinely
told students because her job is to enforce discipline at KCHS, and she may have student disciplinary
cases “just one right after another.” Id.
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In response to Principal Sarna’s questions, Antonio admitted that he consumed two
shots of alcohol in a soda or Gatorade bottle, and disposed of the bottle in a bathroom
trash can east of the school library.87
After Antonio confessed to consuming alcohol to Principal Sarna, Deputy
Charley administered the breath test, which showed that his blood alcohol
concentration was .11%,88 corroborating his confession.89 While Deputy Charley
administered the test, Principal Sarna searched Antonio’s backpack, where she found
a pocketknife. Deputy Charley did not provide Antonio a Miranda warning before
administering the test.90 After administering the test, Deputy Charley left Principal
Sarna’s office to search for the plastic bottle in a nearby bathroom, but failed to find
it.91 When he returned, he provided Antonio with a Miranda warning asked Antonio
about his alcohol consumption.92 Antonio answered Deputy Charley’s questions
about the pocketknife, but refused to answer questions on his alcohol consumption.93
Nonetheless, Deputy Charley wrote Antonio statements to Principal Sarna in his
police report under the “investigation” heading.94 He confiscated Antonio’s
pocketknife, and the State later charged Antonio with possession of alcohol
beverages by a minor.95
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that when a child suspected of
delinquent behavior is questioned in the presence of a law enforcement officer, that
child is subjected to an investigatory detention.96 It looked to the character of the
vice principal’s questioning when the officer was present during Antonio’s
questioning.97 Specifically, the officer’s presence “creat[es] a coercive and
adversarial environment that does not normally exist between school officials and
students.”98 The Court used the officer’s very appearance– “wearing a full uniform,
including his badge and duty belt with a holstered gun–”99 to depict the questioning
as sufficiently coercive to be an investigatory detention. And even though the officer
remained silent throughout the questioning, the Court refused to consider his
presence innocuous. Rather, they reasoned that his presence made it impossible for
Antonio to leave.100 The Court also observed that the officer’s presence also allowed
him to test Antonio’s breath for alcohol, the results of which would help him gather
evidence needed for a delinquency proceeding.101
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While the scope of Section 32A-2-14(C)’s protections apply to a child
regardless of where the questioning occurs, Antonio T. illustrates its application in a
school setting. Specifically, it exposed the nature of questioning that may occur in a
school, where an administrator enlists the support of a police officer in aid of school
discipline. The vice principal and officer collaborated with one another to achieve
the same goal, namely Antonio’s confession. His confession served distinct goals of
the administrator and officer. If Antonio confessed, then the vice principal would
carry out a school disciplinary consequence and the officer would gather evidence
against him in a delinquency proceeding. But the Court focused only on the coercion
caused by the officer. It expressly refused to construe its holding to require an
administrator to provide a Miranda warning when questioning students only for a
violation of school discipline.
As this Note addresses in the following section, by refusing to extend its
holding to administrators, the Court overlooked the possibility that a child’s privilege
against self-incrimination may still come under attack. Specifically, the
administrator can employ tactics as coercive as an officer. Additionally, regulations
common in schools throughout New Mexico enable law enforcement to receive a
child’s statements when questioned during school. Finally, the existing alternative
that would require an administrator to provide a Miranda right– under agency law–
does not apply when an administrator questions a child alone for a school disciplinary
issue.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Necessity for a Miranda Warning When School Administrators Alone
Question Children
1.

Coercive Impact of the School Administrator-Police Officer
Relationship

In response to growing safety concerns, schools have increased the presence
of law enforcement in their buildings.102 As a result, the number of student
interactions with law enforcement officers has dramatically increased.103 Officers
who work in schools generally perform traditional law enforcement duties and
school duties.104 In some school districts, local police departments and school have
developed liaison programs through which police officers are stationed at schools.105
One scholar argues that the increased law enforcement presence has “fostered more
cooperative, formalized, and interdependent relationships between . . . schools and

102. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Eugene C. Bjorklun, Using
Metal Detectors in Public Schools: Some Legal Issues, 111 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996).
103. See Controlling Partners, supra note 14, at 978 (attributing the increased presence of law
enforcement to (1) increased federal funding in schools; (2) high-profile school shootings; and (3) an
increasingly strict approach to adolescent crime).
104. See Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067,
1077–78 (2003).
105. Id. at 1077.
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law enforcement agencies.”106 In other words, law enforcement and school officials
are no longer working independently, but instead rely on one another to achieve their
respective goals.107 This reliance has the potential to convert an encounter with a
child into a coercive environment, where the child sees both the administrator and
the officer as his adversaries.
This coercive impact can occur even when a school administrator alone
questions a child. Even without the aid of a police officer to interrogate a child,
schools are actively seeking the training needed to question children. School
administrator associations, such as the Illinois Principals Association, organize
professional development conferences to learn techniques on investigating student
misbehavior, and on interviewing students suspected of violating school disciplinary
rules.108 The goals of the events are: to help an administrator “assess the credibility
of information that the subject (student or faculty) is giving you during the
interview;” to “structure the investigative interview to maximize the flow of
information;” and to “persuade the guilty to tell the truth.”109 A common method to
achieve these goals is the Reid Technique, developed by John E. Reid & Associates,
the largest interrogation trainer in the world.110 The technique consists of utilizing
“maximization,” which involves confronting a suspect to raise anxiety,111 and
“minimization,” which involves commiserating with a suspect to reduce their
feelings of guilt.112
But while these techniques increase the likelihood that a guilty person will
confess, it also may lead an innocent person to confess falsely.113 And although
studies show that a child is more vulnerable to confessing falsely than an adult,114
the impact of those studies has not precipitated a shift in approaching a child’s

106. Id. at 1079.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., The Reid Technique of Investigative Interviewing and Active Persuasion, ILL.
PRINCIPALS ASS’N, http://www.ilprincipals.org/professional-development/events-search/developinginterview-interrogation-skills-reid-9-steps-of-interrogation (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
109. Id.
110. Drake Bennett, The Dark Science of Interrogation: How to Find Out Anything From Anyone,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-dark-science-of-interrogation/;
see also GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 10 (2003).
111. Bryce Wilson Stucki, Teacher, May I Plead the Fifth?, THE AM. PROSPECT (Jul. 22, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/teacher-may-i-plead-fifth (providing an example of the “maximization”
technique, which suggests telling the suspect “Quit lying to me”).
112. See id. (asserting that a proper application of the “minimization” technique is telling the suspect
“I can really understand how much pressure you were under that day”).
113. See, e.g., Wendy Gillis, Aggressive police questioning may boost false accusations, study finds,
THESTAR.COM (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2015/02/15/aggressive-policequestioning-may-boost-false-accusations-study-finds.html (reporting that “participants in a psychological
study . . . accused another person of stealing a cellphone after being subjected to aggressive and coercive
interrogations about a sham crime”).
114. See, e.g., Pamela S. Pimentel, Andrea Arndorfer & Lindsay C. Malloy, Taking the Blame for
Someone Else’s Wrongdoing: The Effects of Age and Reciprocity, LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, April
13, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000132 (providing that juvenile false confessions may occur at a
disproportionate rate compared to adult false confessions due, in part, to psychosocial immaturity and
vulnerability to external influences).
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misbehavior in school. In fact, the trend appears to be that school administrators are
increasingly interested in the Reid Technique. In 2013, the National Association of
School Resource Officers (NASRO) enrolled over 3,500 to 4,000 police officers and
school administrators in Reid & Associates’ basic program, an increase from the
previous year.115 In New Mexico, Reid & Associates has at least three courses
planned in 2016, offering four-day seminars on the Reid Technique.116
In the context of questioning a child suspected of violating school
discipline, an administrator is likely well-equipped to elicit a child’s confession. By
employing strategies such as the Reid Technique, an administrator can manipulate a
child’s words and responses in order to convince the child to confess. Without the
opportunity to hear the right to remain silent, a child may not stand a chance against
the administrator’s skills in active persuasion.
2.

New Mexico School Policies Concerning Student Interrogations

Many New Mexico school districts have policies that both allow principals
to interrogate students without providing a Miranda warning and require that
principals turn over any evidence of a crime to law enforcement. In 2009, the Las
Cruces Public Schools promulgated a regulation involving a school’s relation with
law enforcement authorities and social service agencies.117 This regulation includes
a section entitled “Administrative Monitoring of Contact with Students.”118 That
section provides that “neither the principal nor his/her designee shall disclose any
written statements made nor the content of statement given during the interview, with
the exception that the statements or the content of the statements may be given to . . .
the district attorney or other law enforcement agencies.”119 The section does not
specify the bases to make contact with students and accordingly may include any
contact, from a minor infraction to a serious felony. More significantly, the
regulation permits an administrator to report a child’s statements to the district
attorney or other law enforcement agencies. Thus, an officer may receive the child’s
confession without the need to provide a Miranda warning beforehand. Identical
regulations were promulgated by Carrizozo Municipals Schools,120 Pojoaque Valley
Schools,121 Dulce Independent School District,122 Belen Consolidated Schools,123
and Walatowa High Charter School.124
The ubiquity of the regulation reflects a common approach in the use of a
child’s statements. Under the regulation, a district attorney has the authority to

115. THESTAR.COM, supra note 113.
116. JOHN REID & ASSOCIATES, The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation,
https://www.reid.com/training_programs/r_interview_schedule.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
117. Las Cruces (N.M.) Public Schools, Regulation, Relations with Law Enforcement Authorities and
Social Service Agencies 7 (2009).
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 3.
120. See Carrizozo (N.M.) Municipal Schools, Board Policy, School Discipline Procedures 14 (2005).
121. See Pojoaque Valley (N.M.) Schools, Student Discipline Policies § B, at 16 (2001).
122. See Dulce (N.M.) Independent School District, School Discipline Process § III, at 29 (2003).
123. See Belen (N.M.) Consolidated Schools, Addressing School Discipline § 743 (2005).
124. See Walatowa High Charter School (Jemez Pueblo, N.M.), Student Discipline Procedures § 363
(2011).
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receive a child’s statements, and the child cannot prevent the disclosure. The impact
of this disclosure is the opportunity for the district attorney to receive a child’s
confession to a delinquent act. Perhaps more problematic than the possibility of a
district attorney obtaining a child’s confession secondhand is the practice of
administrators knowingly intending to share a child’s information with law
enforcement.
3.

Inadequacy of Agency Framework in Providing a Miranda Warning

An alternative to the proposed rule is rooted in the law of agency. If a person
acts as an agent of law enforcement, then that person is required to comply with the
same Miranda requirements as the law enforcement officer. In New Mexico, a
person acts as an agent of law enforcement when two requirements are met: (1)
whether the government knows of and acquiesced to the intrusive conduct, and (2)
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts
or to further his own ends.125 New Mexico courts established this agency test as a
means to determine the constitutionality of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.126
But the New Mexico Court of Appeals applied the agency test in State v.
Antonio T.127 The Court found that the first prong was met when the officer stepped
inside the vice principal’s office while she questioned Antonio.128 However, the
Court found that the second prong was not met because the vice principal questioning
the child for violating school discipline.129 In other words, the vice principal was
attempting to further her own ends by questioning Antonio, not the officer’s.
Accordingly, the vice principal was not required to provide a Miranda warning.
When applying the agency test to an administrator who reports a child’s
confession to police, at least one of the prongs is not met. With respect to the first
prong, an officer may not know of or acquiesce to the administrator’s questioning,
since that questioning may occur outside the presence of an officer. With respect to
the second prong, the Court Appeals’ reasoning in Antonio T. becomes illustrative.
The administrator may conduct questioning in order to resolve a school disciplinary
issue, not to assist an officer in a delinquency proceeding. Even if the administrator
intends to report the child’s statements before conducting the questioning, the nature
of the questioning is still to resolve a school disciplinary issue. Thus, the agency test
would not provide for a Miranda warning under these circumstances.

125. See State v. Santiago, 2009-NMSC-045, ¶ 18, 217 P.3d 89 (establishing the two-prong
agency test).
126. See id.; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV (stating, in part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . ”).
127. 2013-NMCA-035, ¶ 22, 298 P.3d 484.
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 23.
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COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS

An Administrator’s Lack of Formal Legal Training in Criminal
Procedure

One counterargument to the proposed rule is rooted in a school
administrator’s training. Requiring a Miranda warning may make some
administrators apprehensive because they lack legal training in criminal procedure.
The presence of police officers in schools appears to bolster this counterargument,
since the officer’s role is to investigate criminal activity, while the administrator’s
role, in part, is to address student discipline that impacts the educational process.130
However distinct an officer’s and administrator’s roles appear, their collaboration in
addressing crime in school requires that an administrator understand a child’s
constitutional and statutory rights. Additionally, some school districts already
require that an administrator provide a Miranda warning under certain
circumstances. For example, the Albuquerque Public Schools Student Handbook
provides that a school official inform a child, both verbally and in writing, that he or
she has the right not to speak to a police officer before an officer speaks with the
child.131
B.

Impact of a Miranda Warning on the Administrator-Child Relationship

Another contention with the proposal is its impact on the relationship
between an administrator and a child in school. If an administrator provides a
Miranda warning, the informality of the relationship appears to dissolve, making
way for an adversarial environment. A child who may have been willing to speak
with an administrator at the beginning of an encounter may no longer be so willing
once the administrator provides the warning. This counterargument maintains that
repeated hesitations by children will impede an administrator’s ability to resolve
disciplinary issues swiftly. However, since some school districts already require
administrators to provide Miranda warnings, there is no indication that making that
requirement uniform throughout the state will impede on the relationship between a
child and an administrator.
C.

A Parent as a More Appropriate Recipient of a Miranda Warning

Yet another counterargument to the proposed rule is that a parent should
receive the Miranda warning instead of the child. On the one hand, the efficacy of
the warning appears to be met when a parent is notified, since a parent may
understand the legal consequences of a warning. In fact, several school policies in
New Mexico already call for parent notification if either a school administrator or a
law enforcement officer question a child.132 Additionally, a parent who receives the
warning may advocate for the child’s behalf more effectively than the child alone
can. On the other hand, the parent should not serve as a substitute for a child in

130. ALBUQUERQUE PUB. SCHS., STUDENT HANDBOOK 2 (2015–16).
131. See id. at 4.
132. See id.

446

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46: No. 2

receiving the warning. The child will be the one facing legal consequences, and it is
his or her statements that will be used in a delinquency proceeding, not the parents.
D.

A Child with a Learning Disability and the Effectiveness of a Miranda
Warning

Lastly, a child with a learning disability may face extreme difficulty in
understanding a Miranda warning. Even if the administrator were required to provide
one, the child may not understand it well enough to assert it. At best, the child may
be confused about the intricacies of the warning and ask for clarification; at worst,
the child may waive it unknowingly and make self-incriminating statements that may
be reported to police. When considering Miranda rights and their application to a
child with a learning disability, notifying a parent may be the best compromise. With
a parent present during the questioning, the child may someone who can advocate
on his or her behalf.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION

The wider implication of the proposed rule is that a school administrator
must provide a Miranda warning to a child before questioning. In order to effectuate
the proposed rule, schools can adopt the following language in student handbooks:
“Questioning a Child”
If a school official questions a child regarding behavior that violates both a
school rule and may be a crime and reports the child’s statements to police, the
official should remind the child verbally and in writing that he has the right to remain
silent and anything he says can be used against him.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico provided enhanced Miranda protections to children because
it recognizes their vulnerability in the face of questioning by police. As Antonio T.
illustrated, that vulnerability also occurs when an officer is silent and a school
administrator is questioning the child. But a child is equally vulnerable when
questioned solely by an administrator. The greater cooperation between an
administrator and police officer in school, the interrogation tactics administrators
learn, and the frequency of administrator reports to police of student misbehavior all
point to a prevailing trend in questioning students coercively. Accordingly, a child
must have the opportunity to hear the right to remain silent before an administrator
conducts questioning and reports a possible confession to police.
An administrator should have the flexibility to address a child’s
misbehavior in school. In order to ensure that flexibility, no administrator is required
to provide a child with a Miranda warning when questioning a child on a violation
of school discipline. However, that flexibility cannot supersede a child’s
constitutional and statutory privilege against self-incrimination. When an
administrator intends to report a child’s confession to police, the child unknowingly
places himself or herself at risk of a delinquency proceeding. Providing a warning
may prompt the child to consider the consequences of a confession, and thus prevent
the commencement of a delinquency proceeding.

